

Software Un-Security Exploitation Evaluation CadRiver project

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Project objectives

Static tool development

- Security audit help
- Input:
 - Audit objective (security policy)
 - Piece of software (source code)
- Output:
 - Elements that contribute to the audit objective
 - Facts on these elements
- Arguments to show
 - · Insecurity: problems found
 - · Security w.r.t. the security objective

Extension of vulnerability detection tools

- RATS, ITS4, Fortify
- PolySpace, Astrée
- Database of known vulnerabilities



Use cases (1)

- Objective: Attack surface
- Input:
 - Source code
 - Specification of the attack surface
- Output:
 - List of entry/output points (I/O): actual attack surface
 - To be compared with expected ones



Use case (2)

- Objective: Accesses to assets
- Input:
 - Source code
 - List of assets (cryptographic key, password, bank account)
- Output:
 - List of entry/output points
 - Accesses to assets (read / write)
 - Rights and access modes



Use case (3)

- Objective: Information leak
- Input:
 - Source code
 - List of assets
- Output:
 - List of entry/output points
 - Impact of assets on output (O ports)
 - Influence of inputs (I ports) on assets



Use case (4)

- Objective: Correctness of protections
- Input:
 - Source code
 - List of assets
 - List of protections
- Output:
 - List of sensible flows w.r.t. assets
 - Location of protections on the source code
 - Presence/miss of protections on sensible flows
 - List of unprotected assets



Use case (5)

- Objective: Vulnerability instruction
- Input:
 - Source code
 - List of vulnerabilities
 - Present in the target software
 - Computed by other tools
- Output:
 - List of entry/output points
 - Influence of entries on the vulnerabilities
 - Impact of the vulnerabilities on the output
 - Simulation of the vulnerability effect?
 - In terms of execution flow
 - In terms of memory



Example Input

Inputs:

- Vulnerability (2, non verified line)
- Asset (precious)
- Source code:

```
0: x=getc(fic1);
1: gets(line);
2: system(line);
3: fscanf(fic2,precious);
4: y=compute(precious,x);
5: z=makefullcomputation(x,y);
6: printf(z);
```




Exemple Output (1)

	Мар	Definition	Use
0	IN(getc)	Х	fic1
1	IN(gets)	line	keyboard
2	OUT(system)	envt	line
	Vuln(non verified line)		
3	IN(fscanf)	precious	fic2
	Access(precious)		
4	Access(precious)	У	precious, x
5		z	x,y
6	OUT(printf)	envt	z




Example output (2)





CadRiver





Underlying technologies

- Data-flow, control-flow, semantic analysis
- Exploration of the source code
 - Computation of interfaces
 - Search for occurrences of declared assets
 - Search for present vulnerabilities
 - Search for protections
- Dependencies computation
 - Inter-procedural
 - Aliasing
 - Projected on target paths
 - Closed by target variables
- Conformance with objective



Development in progress

- Internal development
- Related studies:
 - Airbus, Aréva: extension of the development process
 - Thales RSS: robustness proved by PolySpace
 - Lafosec: security for functional languages (ANSSI, LIP6, INRIA ...)
- Tool development projects:
 - Baccarat: LIP6, Magillem, Oppida
 - Autostat (Systematic/Aerospace valley)?: CEA, SERMA, Continental, IRIT, Actia, ATOS ...
 - ITEA?: CEA, Verimag, EADS IW, Onera, IMDEA
 - Célar?: