


Distributed Optimization and Games

Introduction to Game Theory

Giovanni Neglia
INRIA – EPI NEO
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What is Game Theory About?

- Mathematical/Logical analysis of situations of conflict and cooperation



- Goal: to prescribe how rational players should act

What is a Game?

- A Game consists of
 - at least two players
 - a set of strategies for each player
 - a preference relation over possible outcomes
- Player is general entity
 - individual, company, nation, protocol, animal, etc
- Strategies
 - actions which a player chooses to follow
- Outcome
 - determined by mutual choice of strategies
- Preference relation
 - modeled as utility (payoff) over set of outcomes

Short history of GT

- ❑ Forerunners:
 - Waldegrave's first minimax mixed strategy solution to a 2-person game (1713), Cournot's duopoly (1838), Zermelo's theorem on chess (1913), Borel's minimax solution for 2-person games with 3 or 5 strategies (20s)
- ❑ 1928: von Neumann's theorem on two-person zero-sum games
- ❑ 1944: von Neumann and Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour*
- ❑ 1950-53: Nash's contributions (Nash equilibrium, bargaining theory)
- ❑ 1952-53: Shapley and Gillies' core (basic concept in cooperative GT)
- ❑ 60s: Aumann's extends cooperative GT to non-transferable utility games
- ❑ 1967-68: Harsanyi's theory of games of incomplete information
- ❑ 1972: Maynard Smith's concept of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- ❑ Nobel prizes in economics
 - 1994 to Nash, Harsanyi and Selten for "their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games"
 - 2005 to Aumann and Schelling "for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis"
 - 2012 to Roth and Shapley "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design"
- ❑ Movies:
 - 2001 "A beautiful mind" on John Nash's life
- ❑ See also:
 - www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/personal_pages/paul_walker/gt/hist.htm

Applications of Game Theory

- ❑ Economy
- ❑ Politics (vote, coalitions)
- ❑ Biology (Darwin's principle, evolutionary GT)
- ❑ Anthropology
- ❑ War
- ❑ Management-labor arbitration
- ❑ Philosophy (morality and free will)
- ❑ National Football league draft
- ❑ “Recently” applied to computer networks
 - Nagle, RFC 970, 1985: “datagram networks as a multi-player game”
 - wider interest starting around 2000

Matrix Game (Normal form)

Strategy set for Player 1

Player 2, Colin

Strategy set for Player 2

		Player 2, Colin		
		A	B	C
Player 1, Rose	A	(2, 2)	(0, 0)	(-2, -1)
	B	(-5, 1)	(3, 4)	(3, -1)

Payoff to Player 1

Payoff to Player 2

□ Simultaneous play

- players analyze the game and then write their strategy on a piece of paper

Students' game

		Colin	
		S	H
Rose	S	15, 15	13, 16
	H	16, 13	14, 14

More Formal Game Definition

- Normal form (strategic) game
 - a finite set N of players
 - a set strategies S_i for each player $i \in N$
 - payoff function $u_i(s)$ for each player $i \in N$
 - where $s \in S = \times_{j \in N} S_j$ is an outcome
 - sometimes also $u_i(A, B, \dots)$ $A \in S_1, B \in S_2, \dots$
 - $u_i : S \rightarrow \mathfrak{R}$

Two-person Zero-sum Games

- One of the first games studied
 - most well understood type of game
- Players interest are strictly opposed
 - what one player gains the other loses
 - game matrix has single entry (gain to player 1)
- A “strong” solution concept

Dominance

- ❑ Strategy S (*weakly*) dominates a strategy T if every possible outcome when S is chosen is at least as good as corresponding outcome in T , and one is strictly better
 - S strictly dominates T if every possible outcome when S is chosen is strictly better than corresponding outcome in T
- ❑ Dominance Principle
 - rational players never choose dominated strategies
- ❑ Higher Order Dominance Principle
 - iteratively remove dominated strategies

Higher order dominance may be enough

		Colin	
		S	H
Rose	S	15, 15	13, 16
	H	16, 13	14, 14

Rose's
S strategy
dominated
By H

GT prescribes:

Rose H - Colin H

Higher order dominance may be enough

GT prescribes:

Rose C - Colin B

		Colin			
		A	B	C	D
Rose	A	12	-1	1	0
	B	3	1	4	-18
	C	5	2	4	3
	D	-16	0	5	-1

(Weakly) Dominated by C

a priori D is not dominated by C

Strictly dominated by B

... but not in general

		Colin			
		A	B	C	D
Rose	A	12	-1	1	0
	B	5	1	7	-20
	C	3	2	4	3
	D	-16	0	0	16

dominated strategy
(dominated by B)

Analyzing the Reduced Game: Movement Diagram

		Colin		
		A	B	D
Rose	A	12	-1	0
	B	5	1	-20
	C	3	2	3
	D	-16	0	16

If Rose plays D,
A is Colin's
best response

Outcome (C, B) is "stable"

- *Pure strategy Nash Equilibrium*
- mutual best responses

Students' game

		Colin	
		S	H
Rose	S	15, 15 → 13, 16	
	H	16, 13 → 14, 14	

The table illustrates a game between Rose and Colin. Rose's strategies are S and H, and Colin's strategies are S and H. The payoffs are given as (Rose, Colin). Red arrows indicate a sequence of moves: from (S, S) to (S, H), from (S, S) to (H, S), from (H, S) to (H, H), and from (H, H) to (S, H).

Games without pure strategy NE

□ An example?


	R	P	S
R	0	-1	1
P	1	0	-1
S	-1	1	0



Games without pure strategy NE

- An example? An even simpler one

	A	B
A	2	0
B	-5	3



Some practice: find all the pure strategy NE

	A	B	C	D
A	3	2	4	2
B	2	1	3	0
C	2	2	2	2

	A	B	C
A	-2	0	4
B	2	1	3
C	3	-1	-2

	A	B	C
A	4	3	8
B	9	5	1
C	2	7	6

Games with no pure strategy NE

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	2 → 0	
	B	← -5 ← 3	

- What should players do?
 - resort to randomness to select strategies

Games with no pure strategy NE

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	5, 0	-1, 4
	B	3, 2	2, 1

- ...but we can find mixed strategies equilibria

Mixed strategies equilibria


- Same idea of equilibrium
 - each player plays a mixed strategy (*equalizing strategy*), that equalizes the opponent payoffs
 - how to calculate it?

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	5, 0	-1, 4
	B	3, 2	2, 1

Mixed strategies equilibria

- Same idea of equilibrium
 - each player plays a mixed strategy, that equalizes the opponent payoffs
 - how to calculate it?

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	-0	-4
	B	-2	-1



Mixed strategies equilibria

- Same idea of equilibrium
 - each player plays a mixed strategy, that equalizes the opponent payoffs
 - how to calculate it?

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	5	-1
	B	3	2

Colin considers
Rose's game

$3/5$

$2/5$

Mixed strategies equilibria

- Same idea of equilibrium
 - each player plays a mixed strategy, that equalizes the opponent payoffs
 - how to calculate it?

		Colin	
		A	B
Rose	A	5, 0	-1, 4
	B	3, 2	2, 1

Rose playing $(1/5, 4/5)$
Colin playing $(3/5, 2/5)$
is an equilibrium

Rose gains $13/5$
Colin gains $8/5$

Good news:


Nash's theorem [1950]

- ❑ Every two-person games has at least one equilibrium either in pure strategies or in mixed strategies
 - Proved using fixed point theorem
 - generalized to N person game
- ❑ This equilibrium concept called Nash equilibrium in his honor
 - A vector of strategies (a profile) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if no player can unilaterally change its strategy and increase its payoff

A useful property

- Given a finite game, a profile is a mixed NE of the game if and only if for every player i , every pure strategy used by i with non-null probability is a best response to other players mixed strategies in the profile
 - see Osborne and Rubinstein, A course in game theory, Lemma 33.2

Game of Chicken



□ Game of Chicken (aka. Hawk-Dove Game)

- driver who swerves loses

Driver 2

		swerve	stay
Driver 1	swerve	0, 0	-1, 5
stay	5, -1	-10, -10	

Drivers want to do opposite of one another

Two equilibria:
not equivalent

not interchangeable!

- playing an equilibrium strategy does not lead to equilibrium

Students' game

		Colin	
		S	H
Rose	S	15, 15	13, 16
	H	16, 13	14, 14

Diagram illustrating the Students' game payoff matrix. The matrix shows the payoffs for Rose (rows) and Colin (columns) based on their choices (S or H). The outcome (15, 15) is highlighted in a light blue box and labeled "better outcome". The outcome (14, 14) is highlighted in a light green box and labeled "single NE". Red arrows indicate the best response for each player: from (15, 15) to (13, 16) for Colin, from (15, 15) to (16, 13) for Rose, from (16, 13) to (14, 14) for Colin, and from (13, 16) to (14, 14) for Rose.

Students' game

		Colin	
		S	H
Rose	S	15, 15	13, 16
	H	16, 13	14, 14

Diagram illustrating the Students' game payoff matrix. The matrix shows payoffs for Rose (rows) and Colin (columns). Red arrows indicate dominance: (S, S) is dominated by (H, S) for Rose, and (S, H) is dominated by (H, H) for Colin. The outcome (H, H) is labeled as Pareto Optimal.

- Def: outcome o^* is Pareto Optimal if no other outcome would give to all the players a payoff not smaller and a payoff higher to at least one of them
- Conflict between group rationality (Pareto principle) and individual rationality (dominance principle)

Students' game = Prisoner's Dilemma

- One of the most studied and used games
 - proposed in 1950
- Two suspects arrested for joint crime
 - each suspect when interrogated separately, has option to confess

		Suspect 2	
		NC	C
Suspect 1	NC	2, 2	10, 1
	C	1, 10	5, 5

payoff is years in jail
(smaller is better)

better outcome

single NE