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Lecture 4

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NOTE: The content of these notes has not been formally reviewed by the lecturer. It is recommended that they are read critically.

Introduction 1

In the previous classes we have seen how taking decisions decisions decisions and the micro scale by each individual affect the general or the macroscopic state of the system. The fist example, the electrons on circuit by taking decision they optimize a global problem, which is minimization of the global power dissipated by Joule effect. But in the second example we have seen that this not always correct, in fact the local policies may lead to efficiency on the macro scale. In the last lesson, the goal was to allocate resources to get the maximum from the system capabilities.

WHAT IS NEW IN THIS LESSON? ELASTIC SOURCES WITH 2 Problem who hills

Having a such graph with 3 soucces: S1,S2 and S3 aiming to communicate with Desitinations: D1, D2 and D3. The problem is how to allocate the shared links between different communications paths.



Figure 1: Communication network example

Considering T1,T2 and T3 respectively the throughput of each source S1,S2 and S3 looking at the shared links we have the following constraints: $T_1+T_2 \leq 1$, $T_1+T_3 \leq 1$

One may be democratic" and do a Max-Min Fairness and give the following allocations:

$$T_1 = \frac{1}{2}, T_2 = \frac{1}{2}, T_3 = \frac{1}{2}$$

The global throughput will be :

while another one can be: $T = \sum_{i=1}^{3} T_i = \frac{3}{2}$

$$T_1 = 0, T_2 = 1, T_3 = 1$$

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And the global throughput will be:

$$T = \sum_{i=1}^{3} T_i = \sum_{i=1}^{3} \frac{1}{2} > 3/2$$

Doing Maximum (minimum Ti) may induce Low utilization of the system.

The question now is how to stay in the middle, between a fair allocation and a high utilisation of the system.

Here we can talk about Proportional Fairness

The proportional fairness insure an optimal allocation to maximize T and in the same time (in some how) try to be fair \mathbf{T}^* is Optimum, means that for every other \mathbf{T} : DEFINITION

w) try to be fair, with for every other **T**:
T* is Optimum, means that for every other **T**:
T* is proportional fair if. (with:
$$T * = \sum T_i^*$$
)
 $T = \frac{T_i - T_i^*}{T_i^*} \leq 0$
back to our example, doing proportional fairness we get the following results
 $T_1^* = \frac{1}{3}, T_2^* = \frac{2}{3}, T_3^* = \frac{2}{3}$ and $T = \frac{5}{3}$
W and **D** and

DEFINITION Weighted proportional fairness: More generally we talk about weighted proportional fairness T^* is proportional fair if:

It can be moved that
$$\sum_{i} \frac{W_i(T_i - T_i^*)}{T_i^*} \leq 0$$
, $W_i > 0$

 T^* is weight proportional fair if only if it solves:

$$Maximize(\sum W_r ln(X_r))$$
$$A.X < C$$

$$\underline{X} \ge \underline{0}$$

 $\begin{array}{l} C_l^*: \ capacity \ of \ link \ "l" \\ A_{e,r} = 1 \ if \ \ l \in r \ and \ 0 \ if \ else \end{array}$

The Utility function:

$$Maximize(\sum U_r(X_r))$$

subject to : $\mathbf{A}.\underline{X} \le \underline{C}$
 $\underline{X} \ge \underline{0}$

The question is how to get the utility function

we define:	λ_r	=	$\frac{W_{i}}{X_{i}}$
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WRAT 15 THE INTERPRETATION , SFZ ?

WHY SO WE

THIS PROBLAN?

PROPERTIES OF U?

WHAT ARE THE

NOTATION IS DIFFERENT FRONT THE REST OF THE COURSE AND NOT ALWAYS COHERENT



Figure 2: The users network relation

The User optimization system is the following, $User(U_r, \lambda_r)$:

 $\begin{aligned} Maximize \ (U_r(\frac{W_r}{\lambda_r}) - W_r) & \quad \text{INTERPRETATION?} \\ Wr \leq 0 \end{aligned}$

The Network optimization system is the following, $Network(\underline{W}, \underline{A}, \underline{C})$:

 $\begin{array}{l} maximizesigma(Wr.ln(Xr))\\ A.\underline{X} \leq \underline{C}\\ \underline{X} > 0 \end{array}$

User + Network == System

Decomposition Theorem: 1. If $\exists \underline{X}, \underline{W} and \underline{\lambda}$ such that:

- 1. $\forall r, W_r = X_r . \lambda_r$
- 2. \underline{X} is the solution of $NETWORK(\underline{W}, \underline{A}, \underline{C})$
- 3. $\forall r, W_r \text{ is the solution of } USER(U_r, \lambda_r)$

Then \underline{X} is the solution of $SYSTEM(\underline{U}, A, \underline{C})$.

3 Solving Problem

In order to solve the SYSTEM problem we will use theorem 2 seen in the previous courses. But the hypothesises of the theorem are not all satisfied. In fact the derivative of U is not undefiled in 0. So we will find another border for \underline{X} :

• WHAT IS X^{*} ? (THE GLOBAL MAXIMUM) $\stackrel{\exists X^{*}}{=} and let b = min_{r}(\frac{X^{*}_{r}}{2})$ $X^{*}_{2} \ge 0$ $\forall 2$, WHY? $\overset{\exists X^{*}}{=} and let b = min_{r}(\frac{X^{*}_{r}}{2})$ HAXIMUM $\stackrel{\forall UMY}{=} WMY$ $\downarrow OUS$ IT EXIST?4-3 So $\forall (r) : X_r \geq b \nearrow O$ Coming back to the SYSTEM problem with the new constraint border "b":

$$Maximize(\sum_{r} (W_r. \ln(X_r))$$
$$A.X^* \le C^*$$
$$X_r \ge b$$

OTHERWISE THERE IS NO ADVANTAGE TO CONSIDER PROBLED

Now we are in the framework of theorem 2. Let's define the Lagrangian function:

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$$\mathcal{L}_S = \sum_r U_r(X_r) + \sum_l \vartheta_l (C_l - \sum_{r/l \in r} X_r)$$

We have:

$$\frac{\partial Ls}{\partial X_r} = 0 \qquad \qquad \text{WHY ?}$$

then

$$U_r(X_r)' + \sum_{l/l \in r} \vartheta_l = 0$$

Now let's try to solve the two problems, USER and NETWORK: USER:

All the conditions of theorem 1 are now verified so:



Figure 3: The plot of Utility function of the User

$$\frac{\partial L_r}{\partial W_r} = \frac{\partial (U_r(\frac{W_r}{\lambda_r}) - W_r)}{\partial W_r} = 0$$

then

$$\frac{1}{\lambda_r} . U_r \left(\frac{W_r}{\lambda_r}\right)' - 1 = 0$$

So

$$\lambda_r = U_r \big(\frac{W_r}{\lambda_r}\big)'$$

Since $U_r(\frac{W_r}{\lambda_r})'$ is monotone then $(U_r(\frac{W_r}{\lambda_r})')^{-1}$ exists and we have:

$$(U_r(\lambda_r)')^{-1} = \frac{W_r}{\lambda_r}$$

Thus

$$W_r = \lambda_r (U_r(\lambda_r)')^{-1}$$
 (equation : 0)

NETWORK: Once again we are in the form of theorem Let's define

$$W_{r} = \lambda_{r} (U_{r}(\lambda_{r})')^{-1} \quad (equation:0)$$
in we are in the forms of theorem 2 Let's define
$$\mathcal{L}_{N} = L(\underline{X}, \underline{\mu}) = \sum_{r} W_{r} \cdot \ln(X_{r}) + \sum_{l} \mu_{l} (C_{l} - \sum_{r/l \in r} X_{r}) \quad \begin{matrix} \mathcal{V} \mathcal{D} . \quad \mathcal{T} \mathcal{H} \mathcal{L} \quad \mathcal{P} \mathcal{R} \mathcal{O} \mathcal{S} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{E} \mathcal{H} \\ \downarrow \mathcal{S} \quad \mathcal{V} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{T} \mathcal{H} \mathcal{E} \quad \mathcal{R} \mathcal{O} \mathcal{S} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{H} \\ \mathcal{S} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{L} \quad \mathcal{S} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{S} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{L} \mathcal{I} \quad \mathcal{S} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{S} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \quad \mathcal{S} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{I} \mathcal{I} \\ \mathcal{I}$$

the Lagrangian of the network

We have (according to theorem 2)

$$\frac{\partial L_N}{\partial X_r} = 0$$

So:

$$\frac{W_r^*}{X_r^*} - \sum_{l \in r} \mu_l^* = 0, \mu_l^* \ge 0 \quad (equation:1)$$

But we have

$$W_r^* = X_r^* . \lambda_r^* \quad (equation:2)$$

Thus (equation 1 + equation 2)

$$\lambda_r^* = \sum_{l \in r} \mu_l^* \quad (equation:3)$$

Then we get the fourth equation:

equation 0 +equation 2 +equation 3 == equation 4

$$U_r'(X_r) = \sum_{l \in r} \mu_l^* \quad (equation: 4)$$

THE UNDERLYING REASONING 15 NISSING

A practical way to solve the optimization problem is to do the penalty approach. The penalty method replaces a constrained optimization problem by a series of unconstrained problems whose solutions ideally converge to the solution of the original constrained problem