



# **Synchronous Languages:** Embedded Critical Real Time Software

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# Critical Software

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- ❑ Roughly speaking a **critical system** is a system whose failure could have **serious consequences**
- ❑ Nuclear technology
- ❑ Transportation
  - ❑ Automotive
  - ❑ Train
  - ❑ Avionics

❑ .....

10/01/2012




## Critical Software (2)

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- In addition , other consequences are relevant to determine the critical aspect of a software:
  - **Financial aspect**
    - Loosing of equipment, bug correction
    - Equipment callback (automotive)
  - **Bad advertising**
    - Intel famous bug

# How Develop critical software ?

## Classical Development V Cycle






# How Develop Critical Software ?

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- Cost of critical software development:
  - Specification : 10%
  - Design: 10%
  - Development: 25%
  - Integration tests: 5%
  - **Validation: 50%**
  
- Fact:
  - Earlier an error is detected, more expensive its correction is.

# Cost of Error Correction



Put the effort on the upstream phase

↳ development based on models



# How Develop Critical Software ?

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- Goals of critical software specification:
  - Define application needs
    - $\Rightarrow$  **specific domain** engineers
  - Allowing application development
    - **Coherency**
    - **Completeness**
  - Allowing application functional validation
    - Express **properties** to be validated

$\Rightarrow$  **Formal models usage**



# Critical software specification

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
- **First Goal:** must yield a **formal description** of the application needs:
  - Standard to allowing communication between computer science engineers and **non** computer science ones
  - General enough to allow different kinds of application:
    - Synchronous (**and/or**)
    - Asynchronous (**and/or**)
    - Algorithmic



# Example of bad understanding

Nasa lost a \$125 million Mars Orbiter because one engineering team used metric units while another used English metrics for a key spacecraft operation

For that reason, information failed to transfer between the Mars Climate Orbiter spacecraft team in Colorado and the mission navigation team in California





# Critical software specification


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- **Second Goal:** allowing **errors detection** carried out **upstream**:
  - Validation of the specification:
    - Coherency
    - Completeness
    - Proofs
  - Test
    - Quick prototype development
    - Specification simulation



# Example of non completeness

From Ariane 5:







# Critical Software Specification (3)

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- **Third goal:** make easier the transition from specification to design (**refinement**)
  - Reuse of specification simulation tests
  - Formalization of design
  - **Code generation**
    - Sequential/distributed
    - Toward a target language
    - Embedded/qualified code

# Relying on Formal Methods





# Synchronous Languages Verification



# Critical Software Validation

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- ❑ What is a **correct** software?
  - ❑ No execution errors, time constraints respected, compliance of results.
- ❑ Solutions:
  - ❑ At model level :
    - Simulation
    - Formal proofs
  - ❑ At implementation level:
    - Test
    - Abstract interpretation



# Validation Methods

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## □ Testing

- Run the program on set of inputs and check the results

## □ Static Analysis

- Examine the source code to increase confidence that it works as intended

## □ Formal Verification

- Argue formally that the application always works as intended






# Testing

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- Dynamic verification process applied at implementation level.
- Feed the system (or one of its components) with a set of input data values:
  - Input data set not too large to avoid huge time testing procedure.
  - Maximal coverage of different cases required.

# Testing (2)

## Program Testing





# Static Analysis

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- The aim of static analysis is to search for errors without running the program.
- *Abstract interpretation* = replace data of the program by an abstraction in order to be able to compute program properties.
- Abstraction must ensure :
  - $\mathbb{A}(P)$  "correct"  $\Rightarrow$  P correct
  - But  $\mathbb{A}(P)$  "incorrect"  $\Rightarrow$  ?



# Static Analysis: example

abstraction: integer by intervals

```
1: x := 1;  
2: while (x < 1000) {  
3:   x := x + 1;  
4: }
```



$$x1 = [1, 1]$$

$$x2 = x1 \cup x3 \cap [-\infty, 999]$$

$$x3 = x2 \oplus [1, 1]$$

$$x4 = x1 \cup x3 \cap [1000, \infty]$$

**Abstract interpretation** theory  $\Rightarrow$  values are fix point equation solutions.



# Formal verification

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- ❑ What about **functional validation** ?
  - ❑ Does the program compute the expected outputs?
  - ❑ Respect of time constraints (temporal properties)
  - ❑ Intuitive partition of temporal properties:
    - **Safety properties**: something bad never happens
    - **Liveness properties**: something good eventually happens



# Safety and Liveness Properties

- Example: the beacon counter in a train:
  - Count the difference between beacons and seconds
  - Decide when the train is ontime, late, early

node **train** (sec, bea : bool) returns (ontime, early, late: bool)

```
let
  diff = (0 -> pre diff) + (if bea then 1 else 0) + (if sec then -1 else 0);
  early = (true -> pre ontime) and (diff > 3) or
          (false -> pre early) and (diff > 1);
  late  = (true -> pre ontime) and (diff < -3) or
          (false -> pre late) and (diff < -1);
  ontime = not (early or late);
tel
```

# Safety and Liveness Properties

- Some properties:
  1. It is impossible to be late and early;
  2. It is impossible to directly pass from late to early;
  3. It is impossible to remain late only one instant;
  4. If the train stops, it will **eventually** get late
- Properties 1, 2, 3 : **safety**
- Property 4 : **liveness**

It refers to unbound future

# Safety and Liveness Properties Checking

- Use of **model checking** techniques
- **Model checking goal**: prove **safety** and **liveness** properties of a system in analyzing a **model** of the system.
- Model checking techniques require:
  - **model** of the system
  - **express** properties
  - **algorithm** to check properties on the model ( $\Rightarrow$  **decidability**)





# Model Checking Techniques

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- **Model** = automata which is the set of program behaviors
- **Properties expression** = **temporal logic**:
  - **LTL** : liveness properties
  - **CTL**: safety properties
- **Algorithm** =
  - **LTL** : algorithm exponential wrt the formula size and linear wrt automata size.
  - **CTL**: algorithm linear wrt formula size and wrt automata size



# Properties Checking

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- Liveness Property  $\Phi$  :
  - $\Phi \Rightarrow$  automata  $B(\Phi)$
  - $L(B(\Phi)) = \emptyset$  décidable
  - $\Phi \models \mathcal{M} : L(\mathcal{M} \otimes B(\sim\Phi)) = \emptyset$
- Scade allows only to verify **safety** properties, thus we will study such properties verification techniques.



# Safety Properties

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- CTL formula characterization:
  - Atomic formulas
  - Usual logic operators: not, and, or ( $\Rightarrow$ )
  - Specific temporal operators:
    - $EX \ \emptyset, EF \ \emptyset, EG \ \emptyset$
    - $AX \ \emptyset, AF \ \emptyset, AG \ \emptyset$
    - $EU(\emptyset_1, \emptyset_2), AU(\emptyset_1, \emptyset_2)$



# Safety Properties Verification (1)

- Mathematical framework:
  - $S$  : finite state,  $(\mathcal{P}(S), \subseteq)$  is a complete lattice with  $S$  as greater element and  $\emptyset$  as least one.
  - $f : \mathcal{P}(S) \longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(S) :$ 
    - $f$  is monotonic iff  $\forall x, y \in \mathcal{P}(S), x \subseteq y \Rightarrow f(x) \subseteq f(y)$
    - $f$  is  $\cap$ -continue iff for each decreasing sequence  $f(\cap x_i) = \cap f(x_i)$
    - $f$  is  $\cup$ -continue iff for each increasing sequence  $f(\cup x_i) = \cup f(x_i)$



## Safety Properties Verification (2)

- Mathematical framework:
  - if  $S$  is finite then monotonic  $\Rightarrow$   $\cap$ -continue et  $\cup$ -continue.
  - $x$  is a fix point iff of  $f$  iff  $f(x) = x$
  - $x$  is a least fix point (lfp) iff  $\forall y$  such that  $f(y) = y, x \subseteq y$
  - $x$  is a greatest fix point (gfp) iff  $\forall y$  such that  $f(y) = y, y \subseteq x$



# Safety Properties Verification (3)

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- **Theorem:**
  - $f$  monotonic  $\Rightarrow f$  has a lfp (resp glp)
  - $\text{lfp}(f) = \cup f^n(\emptyset)$
  - $\text{gfp}(f) = \cap f^n(S)$


Fixpoints are limits of approximations



## Safety Properties Verification (4)

- We call  $\text{Sat}(\varnothing)$  the set of states where  $\varnothing$  is true.
- $\mathcal{M} \models \varnothing$  iff  $s_{\text{init}} \in \text{Sat}(\varnothing)$ .
- Algorithm:
  - $\text{Sat}(\Phi) = \{s \mid \Phi \models s\}$
  - $\text{Sat}(\text{not } \Phi) = S \setminus \text{Sat}(\Phi)$
  - $\text{Sat}(\Phi_1 \text{ or } \Phi_2) = \text{Sat}(\Phi_1) \cup \text{Sat}(\Phi_2)$
  - $\text{Sat}(\text{EX } \Phi) = \{s \mid \exists t \in \text{Sat}(\Phi), s \rightarrow t\}$  (Pre  $\text{Sat}(\Phi)$ )
  - $\text{Sat}(\text{EG } \Phi) = \text{gfp}(\Gamma(x) = \text{Sat}(\Phi) \cap \text{Pre}(x))$
  - $\text{Sat}(\text{E}(\Phi_1 \cup \Phi_2)) = \text{lfp}(\Gamma(x) = \text{Sat}(\Phi_2) \cup (\text{Sat}(\Phi_1) \cap \text{Pre}(x)))$

# Example



**EG (a or b)**

$$gfp (\Gamma(x) = \text{Sat}(\Phi) \cap \text{Pre}(x))$$


$$\Gamma(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4\}) = \text{Sat}(a \text{ or } b) \cap \text{Pre}(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4\})$$

$$\Gamma(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4\}) = \{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_4\} \cap \{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4\}$$

$$\Gamma(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4\}) = \{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_4\}$$



# Example



$$\text{EG (a or b)} \quad \Gamma(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4\}) = \{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_4\}$$

$$\Gamma(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_4\}) = \text{Sat (a or b)} \cap \text{Pre}(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_4\})$$

$$\Gamma(\{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_4\}) = \{s_0, s_1, s_2, s_4\}$$

$$s_0 \models \text{EG (a or b)}$$



# Model checking implementation

- ❑ Problem: the size of automata
- ❑ Solution: **symbolic** model checking
- ❑ Usage of BDD (Binary Decision Diagram) to encode both automata and formula.
- ❑ Each Boolean function has a **unique** representation
- ❑ Shannon decomposition:
  - $f(x_0, x_1, \dots, x_n) = f(1, x_1, \dots, x_n) \vee f(0, x_1, \dots, x_n)$




# Model Checking Implementation

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- When applying recursively Shannon decomposition on all variables, we obtain a tree where leaves are either 1 or 0.
- BDD are:
  - A concise representation of the Shannon tree
  - no useless node (if  $x$  then  $g$  else  $g \leftrightarrow g$ )
  - Share common sub graphs


# Model Checking Implementation (2)

$$(x_1 \wedge x_0) \vee ((x_1 \vee y_1) \wedge (x_0 \wedge y_0))$$




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
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
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
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
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
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
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# Model Checking Implementation (2)

$$(x_1 \wedge x_0) \vee ((x_1 \vee y_1) \wedge (x_0 \wedge y_0))$$





# Model Checking Implementation(3)

- Implicit representation of the of states set and of the transition relation of automata with BDD.
- BDD allows
  - canonical representation
  - test of emptiness immediate ( $bdd = 0$ )
  - complementarity immediate ( $1 = 0$ )
  - union and intersection not immediate
  - Pre immediate



# Model Checking Implementation (4)

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- ❑ But BDD efficiency depends on the number of variables
- ❑ Other method: **SAT-Solver**
  - ❑ Sat-solvers answer the question: given a propositional formula, is there exist a valuation of the formula variables such that this formula holds
  - ❑ first algorithm (DPLL) exponential (1960)



# Model Checking Implementation (4)

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- SAT-Solver algorithm:
  - formula → CNF formula → set of clauses
  - heuristics to choose variables
  - deduction engine:
    - propagation
    - specific reduction rule application (unit clause)
    - Others reduction rules
  - conflict analysis + learning



# Model Checking Implementation (5)

- SAT-Solver usage:
  - encoding of the paths of length  $k$  by propositional formulas
  - the existence of a path of length  $k$  (for a given  $k$ ) where a temporal property  $\Phi$  is true can be reduce to the satisfaction of a propositional formula
  - theorem: given  $\Phi$  a temporal property and  $\mathcal{M}$  a model, then  $\mathcal{M} \models \Phi \Rightarrow \exists n$  such that  $\mathcal{M} \models_n \Phi$  ( $n < |S| \cdot 2^{|\Phi|}$ )






# Bounded Model Checking

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- SAT-Solver are used in complement of implicit (BDD based) methods.
- $\mathcal{M} \models \Phi$ 
  - verify  $\neg \Phi$  on all paths of length  $k$  ( $k$  bounded)
  - useful to quickly extract counter examples

# Model Checking with Observers

- Express safety properties as **observers**.
- An observer is a program which observes the program and outputs **ok** when the property holds and **failure** when its fails






# Properties Validation

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- Taking into account the **environment**
  - without any assumption on the environment, proving properties is difficult
  - but the environment is **indeterminist**
    - Human presence no predictable
    - Fault occurrence
    - ...
  - Solution: use assertion to make **hypothesis** on the environment and make it determinist


## Properties Validation (2)

- Express safety properties as **observers**.
- Express constraints about the environment as **assertions**.



# Properties Validation (3)

- if **assume** remains true, then **ok** also remains true (or failure false).







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# Reactive Program Model Specification


# Reactive and Real-Time Systems




**Objective**



Implementation




# Reactive System Implementation







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
# Synchronous Approach to Reactive System Programming




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
# Synchronous Approach to Reactive System Programming



# Synchronous Approach to Reactive System Programming



# Synchronous Approach to Reactive System Programming





# Determinism & Reactivity

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- **Determinism:**


- The same input sequence always yields  
The same output sequence

- **Reactivity:**

- The program must react<sup>(1)</sup> to any stimulus  
Implies absence of deadlock

(1) Does not necessary generate outputs, the reaction may change internal state only.

# Abstraction







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# LUSTRE Declarative Synchronous Language



# Languages

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**Say what IS or what  
SHOULD BE**

**Declarative** languages

**Imperative** languages

**Say what MUST BE  
DONE**




# LUSTRE

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
- LUSTRE
  - It is a very simple language (4 primitive operators to express reactions)
  - Relies on models familiar to engineers
    - Equation systems
    - Data flow network
  - Lends itself to formal verification (it is a kind of logical language)
  - Very simple (mathematical) semantics

# Operator Networks


- ❑ LUSTRE programs can be interpreted as **networks of operators**.
- ❑ Data « flow » to operators where they are consumed. Then, the operators generate new data. (Data Flow description)




# An example of Data Flow




# Data Flow



# Data Flow




# Data Flow








# Data Flow



# Functional Point of View



$$P' = P + W_N^k * Q$$

$$Q' = P - W_N^k * Q$$



# Flows, Clocks

---

- A **flow** is a pair made of
  - A possibly infinite sequence of **values of a given type**
  - A **clock** representing a sequence of **instants**

**$X:T \quad (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, \dots)$**

# Language (1)

## Variable :

- **typed**
- If not an input variable, defined by 1 and only 1 **equation**
- Predefined types: **int, bool, real**
- tuples: **(a, b, c)**

**Equation** :  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{E}$  means  $\forall \mathbf{k}, \mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{k}} = \mathbf{e}_{\mathbf{k}}$

## Assertion :

Boolean expression that should be always **true** at each instant of its clock.



## Language (2)

---

Substitution principle:

if  $x = E$  then  $E$  can be substituted for  $x$  anywhere in the program and conversely

Definition principle:

A variable is **fully defined** by its declaration and the equation in which it appears as a left-hand side term

# Expressions

## Constants

0, 1, ..., true, false, ..., 1.52, ...

int

bool

+

Imported  
types and  
operators

real

$$c : \alpha \iff \forall k \in \square, c_k = c$$



# « Combinational » Lustre

---

## Data operators

Arithmetical: `+`, `-`, `*`, `/`, `div`, `mod`

Logical: `and`, `or`, `not`, `xor`, `=>`

Conditional: `if ... then ... else ...`

Casts: `int`, `real`

## « Point-wise » operators

$$X \text{ op } Y \Leftrightarrow \forall k, (X \text{ op } Y)_k = X_k \text{ op } Y_k$$



# « Combinational » Example



**node** Average (X, Y: int)

**returns** (M: int);

**let**

M = (X + Y) / 2;

**tel**

*Result*

*Definition*

$$\forall k \in \square, M_k = (X_k + Y_k) / 2_k$$



## Example (suite)

---

**node** Average (X,Y:int)

**returns** (M:int);

**var** S:int; -- local variable

**let**

S = X + Y; -- non significant order

M = S / 2;

**tel**

By **substitution**, the behavior is the same



## « Combinational » Example (2)

---

- **if** operator

node Max (a,b : real) returns (m: real)

let

m = if (a >= b) then a else b;

tel

**functional** «if then else »; it is not a statement



## « Combinational » Example (2)

- **if** operator

node Max (a,b : real) returns (m: real)

let

m = if (a >= b) then a else b;

tel

~~let~~

~~if (a >= b) then m = a ;  
else m = b;~~

~~tel~~



# Memorizing

---

Take the **past** into account!

**pre** (previous):

$$X = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, \dots) : pre(X) = \text{nil}, x_1, \dots, x_{n-1}, \dots$$

Undefined value denoting uninitialized memory: **nil**


**->** (initialize): sometimes call “followed by”


$$X = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n, \dots) , Y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_n, \dots) :$$

$$(X -> Y) = (x_1, y_2, \dots, y_n, \dots)$$

# « Sequential » Examples

$$n = 0 \rightarrow \text{pre}(n) + 1$$





## Sequential » Examples

---


**node** MinMax (X:int) **returns** (min,max:int);

**let**

min = X -> if (X < **pre** min) then X else  
**pre** min;

max = X -> if (X > **pre** max) then X else  
**pre** max;

**tel**



## « Review » Example

---

```
node Count (init:int) returns (c:int);  
  let c = init -> pre c + 2; tel
```

```
node DoubleCall (even:bool) returns (n:int);  
  let  
    n = if even then Count(0) else  
        Count(1);  
  tel
```

Doublecall(ff ff tt tt ff ff tt tt ff) = ?





# Recursive definitions

---

## Temporal recursion

Usual. Use **pre** and **->**

e.g.:  $\text{nat} = 1 \text{ -> pre nat} + 1$

## Instantaneous recursion

e.g.:  $X = 1.0 / (2.0 - X)$

**Forbidden in Lustre**, even if a solution exists!

Be carefull with cross-recursion.



# Clocks

---

## Basic clock

Discrete time induced by the input sequence

Derived clocks (slower)

**when** (filter operator):

**E when C** is the sub-sequence of **E** obtained by keeping only the values of indexes  $e_k$  for which  $c_k = \text{true}$



# Examples of clocks

Basic cycles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
C1	true	false	true	true	false	true	false	true
Cycles of C1	1		2	3		4		5
C2	false		true	false		true		true
Cycles of C2			1			2		3



# Example of sampling

---

`nat, odd: int`

`halfBaseClock: bool`

`nat = 0 -> pre nat + 1;`

`halfBaseClock =`

`true -> not pre halfBaseClock;`

`odd = nat when halfBaseClock;`

`nat` is a flow on the basic clock;

`odd` is a flow on `halfBaseClock`


**Exercise: write even**

# Interpolation operator

« converse » of sampling

**current** (interpolation) :

Let **E** be an expression whose clock is **C**, **current(E)** is an expression on the clock of **C**, and its value at any instant of this clock is the value of **E** at the last time when **c** was **true**.



**current (X when C) ≠ X**

**current can yield nil**

# Example of current

Basic cycles	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
C	ff	tt	ff	tt	ff	ff	tt
X	x1	x2	x3	x4	x5	x6	x7
Y = X when C		x2		x4			x7
Z = current(Y)	nil	x2	x2	x4	x4	x4	x7

# Other examples of current

X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Y	t	f	t	t	t	f	f
C	t	t	f	t	t	f	t
Z=X when C							
H=Y when C							
T=Z when H							
current T							
current (current T)							

# Other examples of current

X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Y	t	f	t	t	t	f	f
C	t	t	f	t	t	f	t
Z=X when C	1	2		4	5		7
H=Y when C							
T=Z when H							
current T							
current (current T)							



# Other examples of current

X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Y	t	f	t	t	t	f	f
C	t	t	f	t	t	f	t
Z=X when C	1	2		4	5		7
H=Y when C	t	f		t	t		f
T=Z when H							
current T							
current (current T)							

# Other examples of current

X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Y	t	f	t	t	t	f	f
C	t	t	f	t	t	f	t
Z=X when C	1	2		4	5		7
H=Y when C	t	f		t	t		f
T=Z when H	1			4	5		
current T							
current (current T)							

# Other examples of current

X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Y	t	f	t	t	t	f	f
C	t	t	f	t	t	f	t
Z=X when C	1	2		4	5		7
H=Y when C	t	f		t	t		f
T=Z when H	1			4	5		
current T	1	1		4	5		5
current (current T)							

# Other examples of current

X	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Y	t	f	t	t	t	f	f
C	t	t	f	t	t	f	t
Z=X when C	1	2		4	5		7
H=Y when C	t	f		t	t		f
T=Z when H	1			4	5		
current T	1	1		4	5		5
current (current T)	1	1	1	4	5	5	5



# The initialization issue

---

**$Y = \text{current}(X \text{ when } C)$**  where  $C_1 = \text{false}$  is erroneous.

## Possible solutions:

- ❑ Strict discipline: ensure that  $C_1$  is always true.


- ❑ Force the clock to true at the first instant:

**$CC = \text{true} \rightarrow C; Y = \text{current}(X \text{ when } CC);$**

- ❑ Provide a default value  $D$  :

**$Y = \text{if } C \text{ then current}(X \text{ when } C) \text{ else}$**

**$D \rightarrow \text{pre } Y;$**



# First programs



# Bistable

---

- Node **Switch** (on,off:bool) returns (s:bool); such that:
  - S raises (false to true) if on, and falls (true to false) if off
  - must work even off and on are the same

```
node Switch (on,off:bool) returns (s:bool)
let
  s = if (false → pre s) then not off else on;
tel
```



# Count

---

□ A node **Count** (**reset**, **x**: bool) returns (**c**:int) such that:

□ **c** is reset to 0 if **reset**, otherwise it is incremented if **x**

node **Count** (**reset**, **x**: bool) returns (**c**:int)  
let

**c** = if **reset** then 0  
else if **x** then (0 -> pre **c**) + 1  
else (0 -> pre **c**)

tel



# Counters

```
node COUNTER (init, incr:int; reset:bool)
    returns (n:int);
let
    n = init -> if reset then init else
                pre(n) + incr;
tel;
```

C	tt	ff	tt	tt	ff	ff	tt
COUNTER(0,2,false)	0	2	4	6	8	10	12
COUNTER((0,2,false)when C)	0		2	4			6
COUNTER(0,2,false)when C	0		4	6			12

# Edges

```
node Edge (b:bool) returns (f:bool);  
-- detection of a rising edge  
let  
    f = false -> (b and not pre(b));  
tel;
```

initial

Undefined at  
the first instant

```
Falling_Edge = Edge(not c);
```



# A Stopwatch

---

- ❑ 1 integer output : **time**
- ❑ 3 input buttons: **on\_off**, **reset**, **freeze**
  - ❑ **on\_off** starts and stops the watch
  - ❑ **reset** resets the stopwatch (if not running)
  - ❑ **freeze** freezes the displayed time (if running)
- ❑ Local variables
  - ❑ **running**, **freezed** : bool (**Switch** instances)
  - ❑ **cpt** : int (**Count** instance)



## A stopwatch

---

```
node Stopwatch (on_off, reset, freeze: bool)
    returns (time:int)
```

```
var running, freezed: bool; cpt:int
```

```
let
```

```
running = Switch(on_off, on_off);
```

```
freezed = Switch(freeze and running,
                 freeze or on_off);
```

```
cpt = Count (reset and not running, running);
```

```
time = if freezed then (0 -> pre time) else cpt;
```

```
tel
```



# A Stopwatch with Clocks

```
node Stopwatch (on_off, reset, freeze: bool)
```

```
returns (time:int)
```

```
var running, freezed : bool;
```

```
  cpt_clock, time_clock : bool;
```

```
  (cpt : int) when cpt_clock;
```

```
let
```

```
  running = Switch(on_off, on_off);
```

```
  freezed = Switch ( freeze and running,  
                    freeze or on_off);
```

```
  cpt_clock = true -> reset or running;
```

```
  cpt = Count ((not running, true) when cpt_clock);
```

```
  time_clock = true -> not freezed;
```

```
  time = current(current(cpt) when time_clock);
```



# Modulo Counter

---

node Counter (incr:bool, modulo : int)  
returns (cpt:int)

let

cpt = 0 -> if incr  
then MOD(pre (cpt) +1, modulo)  
else pre (cpt);

tel



# Modulo Counter with Clock

---

```
node ModuloCounter (incr:bool, modulo : int)
    returns (cpt:int,
            modulo_clock: bool)
let
    cpt = 0 -> if incr
                then MOD(pre (cpt) +1, modulo)
                else pre (cpt);
    modulo_clock = false ->
                pre(cpt) <> MOD(pre(cpt)+1);
tel
```



# Timer

---

```
node Timer (dummy:bool)
    returns (hour, minute, second:bool)
var hour_clock, minute_clock, day_clock;
let
    (second, minute_clock) = ModuloCounter(true, 60);
    (minute, hour_clock) =
        ModuloCounter(minute_clock, 60);
    (hour, day_clock) =
        ModuloCounter(hour_clock, 24);
tel
```





# Numerical Examples

---

- Integrator node:
  - $f$  : real function and  $Y$  its integrated value using the trapezoid method:
  - $F, STEP$  : 2 real such that:

$$F_n = f(x_n) \quad \text{and} \quad x_{n+1} = x_n + STEP_{n+1}$$

$$Y_{n+1} = Y_n + (F_n + F_{n+1}) * STEP_{n+1}/2$$



# Numerical Examples

---

node **integrator** (**F**, **STEP**, **init** : real)

returns (**Y** : real);

let

**Y** = **init** -> pre(**Y**) + ((**F** + pre(**F**))\***STEP**)/2.0

tel



# Numerical Examples

---

node **sincos** (**omega** : real)

returns (**sin**, **cos** : real);

let

**sin** = **omega** \* integrator(**cos**, 0.1, 0.0);

**cos** = 1 - **omega** \* integrator(**sin**, 0.1, 0.0);

tel



# Numerical Examples

---

node **sincos** (**omega** : real)

returns (**sin**, **cos** : real);

let

**sin** = **omega** \* integrator(**cos**, 0.1, 0.0);

**cos** = 1 - **omega** \* integrator( , 0.1, 0.0);

tel



(0.0 -> pre(sin))



# Safety and Liveness Properties

- Example: the beacon counter in a train:
  - Count the difference between beacons and seconds
  - Decide when the train is ontime, late, early

node **train** (sec, bea : bool) returns (ontime, early, late: bool)

```
let
  diff = (0 ->pre diff) + (if bea then 1 else 0) + (if sec then -1 else 0);
  early = (true -> pre ontime) and (diff > 3) or
          (false -> pre early) and (diff > 1);
  late  = (true -> pre ontime) and (diff < -3) or
          (false -> pre late) and (diff < -1);
  ontime = not (early or late);
tel
```



# Train Safety Properties

---

- It is impossible to be late and early;
  - $ok = \text{not (late and early)}$
- It is impossible to directly pass from late to early;
  - $ok = \text{true} \rightarrow (\text{not early and pre late});$
- It is impossible to remain late only one instant;
  - $\text{Plate} = \text{false} \rightarrow \text{pre late};$   
□  $\text{PPlate} = \text{false} \rightarrow \text{pre Plate};$   
□  $ok = \text{not (not late and Plate and not PPlate)};$



# Train Assumptions

---

- property = assumption + observer: "*if the train keeps the right speed, it remains on time*"
- observer = ok = ontime
- assumption:
  - naïve: assume = (bea = sec);
  - more precise : bea and sec alternate:
    - SF = Switch (sec and not bea, bea and not sec);
    - BF = Switch (bea and not sec, sec and not bea);
    - assume = (SF => not sec) and (BF => not bea);

# Model Checking with observers

## Observers in Scade

**P**: aircraft autopilot and security system

