



Abstract Interpretation of Symbolic Execution for Information Flow Analysis

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23 October 2008



Work in Progress Warning



Mobius: Mobility, Ubiquity and Security

Proof-carrying code for Java on mobile devices

FP6 **Integrated Project** developing novel technologies for trustworthy global computing, using **proof-carrying code** to give users independent **guarantees** of the **safety** and **security** of **Java** applications for mobile phones and PDAs

- Innovative trust management, digital evidence of program behavior
- Static enforcement, checking code before it starts
- Modularity, building trusted applications from trusted components

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This talk

Integration of the two Mobius approaches for PCC basis

- **Type Systems**, type checking
- **Program Logics**, theorem proving

Type Systems

- Automatic, decidable
- Low precision
- Fixed precision
- Scaling to JAVA?

Program Logics

- Interactive systems
- High precision
- Formal specification
- JAVA CARD+ (byte/source)

Type Systems vs. Program Logics

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Integration?
Synergies?

Integration of a Type System into a Program Logic

Security properties often guaranteed by dedicated type systems

Non-Interference Low (public) variables depend not on High (secret) ones

Declassification Non-interference relativized to common knowledge

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Hähnle et al., **Integration of a Security Type System into a Program Logic**,
TCS 402(2/3), pp172–189, 2008

- Translate Hunt-Sands flow-sensitive type system into program logic
- Type derivation = sequent calculus proof = symbolic execution
- Common semantics and calculus for type/deductive analysis

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
Achieved integration, but at price of some drawbacks

- Adaptation to other type systems remains non-trivial effort
- Toy language, incompatible to KeY's `JAVA CARD` program logic

Basis for Reasoning about JAVA CARD Programs

KeY System: JAVA Program Logic & Verifier

- Sequent calculus for JAVA program logic
- Sequent calculus proof = symbolic execution + invariant rule
- Interactive prover with high degree of automation, e.g.:
 - Correctness of Mondex reference implementation (1 interaction)
 - Correctness of JAVA CARD API reference implementation



Symbolic execution of conditional

$$\text{if } \frac{\Gamma, b \doteq \text{true} \Rightarrow [p; \text{rest}]\phi, \Delta \quad \Gamma, b \doteq \text{false} \Rightarrow [q; \text{rest}]\phi, \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow [\text{if } (b) \{ p \} \text{ else } \{ q \}; \text{rest}]\phi, \Delta}$$

May require case split into different symbolic execution branches

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Symbolic execution of loops:

$$\text{unwindLoop} \frac{\Gamma \Rightarrow [\text{if } (b) \{ p; \text{while } (b) p \}; r]\phi, \Delta}{\Gamma \Rightarrow [\text{while } (b) \{ p \}; r]\phi, \Delta}$$

No termination if no fixed loop bound can be determined

Modular integration of (security) type system with (JAVA) program logic

The Challenge

Modular integration of (security) type system with (JAVA) program logic

```
x = (x % 2 * y) * z - 327;
```

Program logic:
precise symbolic execution

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x = (x, y, z);
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Hunt-Sands type system viewed as
bookkeeping of variable dependencies

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Abstraction

$x = (x, y, z);$

Program logic:
precise symbolic execution

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
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
Our Idea

View type derivation as abstract interpretation of symbolic computation

Abstraction from Symbolic Execution



Abstraction from Symbolic Execution



Symbolic execution as concrete domain in abstract interpretation

Program Logic vs. Abstract Interpretation

Symbolic execution as concrete domain in abstract interpretation

	Program Logic	Abstract Interpretation
Program representation	abstract syntax tree	control flow graph
Merging execution paths	unusual, but possible	yes
Computation states	implicit	explicit
Value Computation	symbolic	concrete
Node semantics	single path	collecting
Loop treatment	invariant from user	fixed point
Termination	in general, no	if no ∞ chains

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Unwind control flow graph or permit sequent proof dag
(Leino InfProL'05, Schmitt & Weiß VERIFY'07)

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Identify symbolic expression (formula) with set of its models

Symbolic execution converges against collecting semantics

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Remaining issues: state representation and loop treatment

Abstract Interpretation of JAVA is problematic

Computation on **abstract domain** using **approximations** of concrete ops:

$$\alpha(x * y) = \alpha(x) \alpha(*) \alpha(y) = \alpha(x) \cup \alpha(y)$$

- JAVA has dozens of operators (reducible to very few in program logic)
- Inter-procedurality
- Complex datatypes
- Complex operational semantics (dynamic dispatch, exceptions, ...)

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Separate symbolic execution machinery from state representation

Explicit Computation States

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Separate symbolic execution machinery from state representation

Needed: syntactic representation of symbolic computation states

- Describe symbolic state change in concise way
- Simple semantics, small set of operators
- **Our solution:** KeY updates (other options: Why, B gen. subst., ...)

Definition (Update)

Let l, l_i be JAVA program locations and v, v_i first-order terms

- $\{l := v\}$ is an **atomic update**
- $\{l_1 := v_1\}\{l_2 := v_2\}$ is a **sequential update**
- $\{l_1 := v_1 \mid \dots \mid l_n := v_n\}$ is a **(bounded) parallel update** (last-win)
- For T well-ordered type: **quantified (parallel) update** (minimal-win)

`\for T x; \if P; l := v`

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$\{\text{for } T \ x; \ \text{if } P; \ l := v\}$

Usage of updates

- KeY symbolic execution engine renders state change embodied by loop-free JAVA program in terms of updates
- Updates have normal form, are aggressively simplified

Update abstraction for non-interference analysis

Low (public, insecure) values can't depend on **High** (secret, secure) ones

- $\alpha(\{l := v\}) = \{l^\alpha := \text{Locations}(v)\}$
- Need to approximate semantics of update combinators (usually \cup)
- Semantics of **abstract update** $\{l^\alpha := \{l_1, \dots, l_n\}\}$:
Update of l with first-order term that depends at most on l_1, \dots, l_n

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```
int h1, h2, t;  
t=h1; h1=h2; h2=t;  
t=t-h2;
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$\{h1 := h2 \mid h2 := h1 \mid t := 0\}$

Symbolic \uparrow Execution

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Simplification **before**
abstraction!

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
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Schema of Symbolic Execution with Update Abstraction




Symbolically execute `JAVA` statement in program logic — precise

Schema of Symbolic Execution with Update Abstraction




Compute resulting state change in terms of updates

Schema of Symbolic Execution with Update Abstraction




Abstraction of state update

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
Continue symbolic execution of JAVA in program logic

Schema of Symbolic Execution with Update Abstraction



Compute **incremental** state change since Block i as an update

Schema of Symbolic Execution with Update Abstraction



Abstract state update and **compose** with previous — abstract interpretation

Abstracting all locations is wasteful!

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Example (Aliasing)

```
class C { public int a; public static N=2; }  
C o = new C();  
o.a=1; u.a=C.N; o.a=C.N; if (o.a!=u.a) l=h else h=1;
```

At first `l` is abstract.

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
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```

At first `l` is abstract. Symbolic execution: $\{o.a := 2 \mid u.a := 2 \mid h := 1\}$

Then abstraction only of `h`: $\{o.a := 2 \mid u.a := 2 \mid h^\alpha := \{1\}\}$

Schema of Lazy Abstraction



When encountering a loop ...

```
while (guard) { body }
```

- 1 Save current abstract state in s_{old}
 - 2 Unwind loop once, execute guard, body, and obtain s
 - 3 Compute point-wise \sqcup on locations in s_{old} , s :
 - 1 Different concrete values of l_{old} , l : abstract both
 - 2 One of l_{old} , l concrete: make it abstract
 - 3 Both s_{old} , s abstract: $\sqcup = \cup$
 - 4 Repeat until s_{old} equal to s
 - 5 Conjoin s with $!guard$
- Terminates: finite number of locations, finite abstract domain
 - Abstraction is driven by search for invariant

Low variables depend not on High variables

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Formulating Non-Interference in Program Logic (Darvas et al. 2003)

Location l depends **at most** on locations h_1, \dots, h_n in program p
Let l_1, \dots, l_m be remaining locations in p that l **may** depend on

Validity of: $\forall l_1, \dots, l_m. \exists r. \forall h_1, \dots, h_n. wp(p, l \doteq r)$

Can be expressed in KeY's program logic (but also Coq, Isabelle, etc.)

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Soundness

- 1 Soundness of underlying symbolic execution of JAVA
- 2 Soundness of abstraction (from first-order terms to dependency sets)
- 3 Soundness of composition of abstract updates

Summary of Important Points

- **Symbolic execution** viewed as syntactic rendering of **collecting semantics** of concrete domain within AI
- Incremental computation of syntactic `JAVA` state representation (updates)
- Precise symbolic execution/first-order simplification **before** abstraction
No need to handle complex language concepts at level of **type system**
 - Aliasing analysis
 - Exception handling
- Dynamic and lazy change of degree of abstraction during execution
- Direction of search for abstraction: **precise** \Rightarrow **abstract**
 - Exploit information gained from precise symbolic execution