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Abstract Auctions have become a common technique for economic exchanges in the Internet, and this talk will outline a theory of auctions where buyers and sellers compete collectively, resulting in the emergence of equilibrium economic outcomes. The underlying mathematics is derived from queueing theory and the analysis we present results in product form equilibrium solutions. About the Speaker Erol's current research addresses self-organised communications, as well as broader issues of the theory of networked systems including chemistry, bioinformatics, economics and physics, and his recent papers appear in the Physical Review, as well as in ACM and IEEE journals. Born in Turkey, Erol founded the performance evaluation research activities at INRIA and in French Universities, and his work has had world wide impact. As a result he was the first computer scientist to receive the Prix France Telecom in 1996, he was elected to the Academy of Sciences of Hungary and Turkey, he received the ACM SIGMETRICS Life-Time Achievement Award and is a Fellow of ACM and IEEE. A member of Academie des Technologies, he received honoris causa doctorates from the Universities of Liege, Roma II, and Bogazi"i (Istanbul), and Italy awarded him the "Commander of Merit" and "Grand Officer" Medals.
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