



06. Privacy in Targeted advertising and Facebook ads explanations

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
September 17th-21st, 2018
Web Privacy course
University of Trento




Today's class

- Targeted advertising
- Real-Time Bidding protocol (RTB)
- Cookie synching
- Attribute and PII-based targeting on Facebook
- Investigating Facebook Ad explanations









2010

Display Advertising Technology Landscape



2017

VIDEO LUMAscape











Targeted Advertisement and Real-Time Bidding

COLLABORATION BETWEEN PUBLISHERS, AD EXCHANGES AND ADVERTISERS

Targeted advertisement

 Targeted advertisement allows to assign a concrete ad to an interested user

 Real-Time Bidding (RTB) is a protocol for transacting digital display ads in real time




Real-Time Bidding (RTB) AccuWeather **Advertisers** Ad Exchange doubleclick.com Newchic Newchic Newchic **AccuWeather** WINNER!!! Real-time-bidding (RTB)

Why would advertiser bid on a user?








Cookie synchronization


What is a Cookie synchronization?

 the process by which two different trackers link the IDs they've given to the same user

Cookie synchronization




Example of cookie synchronization



Cookie Syncing

• *s.com* matches their cookie with *d.com* using an HTTP redirect



What if I delete all my cookies?


Important detail:

If at least one tracker respawns one cookie, he passes it to other trackers

Privacy problem:

■ Thus, even trackers that don't employ respawning gain the ability to continually track users who clear cookies!

Cookie syncing graphically



Large-scale study of cookie synching

• 3,000 domains, top parties involved in cookie synching:

All Cookies All	No 3P Cookies			
Domain	# IDs	Domain	# IDs	
gemius.pl	33	gemius.pl	36	
doubleclick.net	32	$207.\mathrm{net}$	27	
207.net	27	omtrdc.net	27	
rubiconproject.com	25	cbsi.com	26	
omtrdc.net	24	parsely.com	16	
cbsi.com	24	marinsm.com	14	
adnxs.com	22	gravity.com	14	
openx.net	19	cxense.com	13	
cloudfront.net	18	cloudfront.net	10	
rlcdn.com	17	doubleclick.net	10	

Even more IDs get synched if the user blocks third-party cookies!



Large-scale study of cookie synching

- 100,000 domains
- doubleclick.net is synching the most:
 - 108 cookies to 118 partners
- The vast majority of top third parties sync cookies with at least one other party:
 - 45 out of top 50
 - 85 out of top 100
 - 157 out of top 200
 - **460** out of top 1,000

Limitations on detection of synched IDs

- Only detect matched user IDs in clear not detected if IDs are obfuscated
- Two studied examined the behavior of DoubleClick only.
- Imprecise detection of information flows between companies because they rely on HTTP headers
 - Inclusion of dynamic content is not linked to the party that created it

Real-Time Bidding (RTB) DSP SSP (1) User visits ADX (3) Bid request, publisher's (2) Ad request User info User webpage Adslot (6) Winner's impression (5) Place bids delivery (7) "charge price" and "impression rendered" notification (4) Retrieve user interests, User Tracking geolocation, behavior Data Hub: DMP, Data Broker, etc. Third-party tracking **Cookie synching**

Retargeted ads

 a user is targeted with ads related to the exact products she has previously browsed






Key insight: use retargeted ads to detect information flows

- Two conditions for retargeted ads served for user *u*:
 - the company must know that u browsed a specific product on a specific e-commerce site
 - the company must be able to uniquely identify *u* during an auction

[see <u>an experiment setup</u>]

Real-Time Bidding (RTB)





Participant 1		Participant 2	Chains	Ads	Heuristics
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	googlesyndication	9090	1887	$\leftarrow \rightarrow P$
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	doubleclick	3610	1144	\rightarrow E, P \leftarrow DC, P
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	adnxs	3263	1066	←→ E, P
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	rubiconproject	1586	749	←→ E, P
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	servedbyopenx	707	460	$\leftarrow \rightarrow P$
doubleclick	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	steelhousemedia	362	27	\rightarrow P \leftarrow E, P
mathtag	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	mediaforge	360	124	←→ E, P
netmng	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	scene7	267	119	→ E ←?
googlesyndication	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	adsrvr	107	29	$\leftarrow \rightarrow P$
rubiconproject	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	steelhousemedia	86	30	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ E
googlesyndication	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	steelhousemedia	47	22	?
adtechus	\rightarrow	adacado	36	18	?
atwola	\rightarrow	adacado	32	6	?
adroll	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	adnxs	31	8	?

Heuristics Key (used by prior work)

E – share exact cookies

P – special URL parameters

DC – DoubleClick URL parameters

? – Unknown sharing method

Participant 1		Participant 2	Chains	Ad	Heuristics	Heuristics Key
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	googlesyndication	9090	1887	$\leftarrow \rightarrow P$	(used by prior work)
criteo	\leftrightarrow	doubleclick	3610	1144	\rightarrow E, P \leftarrow DC, P	E – share exact
criteo	\leftrightarrow	adnxs	3263	106€	←→ E, P	cookies
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	rubiconproject	1586	749	←→ E, P	P – special URL
criteo	\leftrightarrow	servedbyopenx	707	460	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ P	parameters
doubleclick	\leftrightarrow	steelhousemedia	362	27	\rightarrow P \leftarrow E, P	DC – DoubleClick
mathtag	\leftrightarrow	mediaforge	360	124	←→ E, P	URL parameters
netmng	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	scene7	267	119	→ E ←?	·
googlesyndication	\leftrightarrow	adsrvr	107	29	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ P	? – Unknown
rubiconproject	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	steelhousemedia	86	30	←→ E	sharing method
googlesyndication	\leftrightarrow	steelhousemedia	47	22	?	
adtechus	\rightarrow	adacado	36	18	?	
atwola	\rightarrow	adacado	32	€	?	
adroll	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	adnxs	31	8	?	27

Participant 1		Participant 2	Chains	Ads	Heuristics	
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criteo	\leftrightarrow	doubleclick	3610	1144	\rightarrow E, P \leftarrow DC, P	۱
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	adnxs	3263	106€	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ E, P	(
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	rubiconproject	1586	749	←→ E, P	-
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	servedbyopenx	707	460	$\leftarrow \rightarrow P$	i
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mathtag	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	mediaforge	360	124	←→ E, P	ľ
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criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	rubiconproject	1586	749	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ E, P	р.
criteo	\leftrightarrow	servedbyopenx	707	460	←→ P	pa
doubleclick	\leftrightarrow	steelhousemedia	362	27	\rightarrow P \leftarrow E, P	D
mathtag	\leftrightarrow	mediaforge	360	124	←→ E, P	UI
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rubiconproject	\leftrightarrow	steelhousemedia	86	30	←→ E	sh
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31% of cookie matching partners would be missed.

RTB and Tracking ecosystem

Important detail:

 Targeted advertisement and RBT is based on personal data: cookies, browsing history, preferences...

Transparency studies:

- Hard to analyse tracking and RTB together
- Only a part of the process is visible in the user's browser
- Hard to establish what data is collected by trackers

Privacy Risks in Targeted Advertising

Cambridge Analytica scandal

- A lot of user's data collected
- Political ads that target users



- Reactions
 - How did they collect all that data?
 - Why collect this data? What did it allow them to do?

Why collect this data? What did it allow them to do?

"Cambridge Analytica generally utilizes **custom audiences**, some of which were created form contract lists and other identifiers... and in some instances, refined those audiences with **additional targeting attributes**."

- Facebook (in response to U.S. Senate questions)

How many of you understand what this means?

Targeted advertising


Users who see ad called the audience

How can advertiser select their audience?


Ad on a broadcast medium (TV)

Ad targeting search keywords


Ad targeting *user attributes*



Ads on Facebook




Anyone can be an advertiser in just a few clicks!





Targeting method 1: Attributes

- Advertiser can include/exclude attributes to create audience
- Attributes attached to users based on
 - Facebook activity
 - Third-party Web browsing
 - "Partner" companies
- >1,200 well-defined attributes
- >250,000 free-form attributes




How can advertisers target users?


Traditional targeted advertising: boolean formula

Audience = married + new mover + lives in Grenoble

Many attributes available for targeting



Attributes can be invasive



Slide of Oana Goga

Data on everyone

- Out of 230M users (US):
 - Politics (US): 179M
 - Financial/Net worth/Liquid Assets: 74M
 - Family & Relationships: 138M

Slide of Oana Goga 4

Where these attributes come from?

Collected all targeting attributes form 8 countries

Country	Facebook	Acxiom	Epsilon	Experia		Data broke Inspecifie	
					(,	inspecific	
US	614	128	14	5	350	10	1121
UK	614	103	0	17	19	0	753
France	614	21	0	0	0	0	635
Germany	614	60	0	0	0	0	674
Australia	614	24	0	34	0	0	672
Brazil	614	0	0	20	0	0	634
Japan	614	17	0	0	0	0	631
India	614	0	0	0	0	0	614

Slide of Oana Goga

PII-based targeting

Targeted advertising


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Targeted advertising

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
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Ad on a broadcast medium (TV)


Ad targeting search keywords

Ad targeting *user attributes*

Ad targeting *identified users*




Targeting method 2: PII




Advantages for advertiser:

- 1. Pay only for users you want to reach
- 2. Exploit different external data sources

PII-based targeting is common



PII-based targeting is common




This is a query to the user database!

Could these statistics **intentionally** leak user information?

Anybody can be an advertiser...

Features of Facebook's size estimates




Exploiting these features



Exploiting these features


Goal: given victim's email address, find if victim is in a given list of phone numbers



Size estimate

Exploiting these features

Goal: given victim's email address, find if victim is in a given list of phone numbers



Size estimate

Victim in the list of phone numbers?

Attack: Infering user's phone numbers

Can ask: Is Victim in

Target list

Is victim in

100-000-0000
100-000-0001
100-000-0002
...
199-999-9999

Is **victim** in

200-000-0000 200-000-0001 200-000-0002 ... 299-999-9999

Is **victim** in

010-000-0000 010-000-0001 010-000-0002 ... 919-999-9999

If **No**: First digit is not 1

If Yes: First digit is 1

If **No**: First digit is not 2

If **Yes**: First digit is 2

If **No**: Second digit is not 1

If **Yes**: Second digit is 1

Attacks discovered

- Other attacks:
 - De-anonymise individual visitors to attacker's website
 - Infer PII for visitors to attacker's website en masse
- All attacks are easy to launch and have a large-scale impact:
 - Anyone can conduct an attack
 - Any Facebook user can be a potential victim
 - No interaction with the victim
- Reponsibly disclosed with Facebook:
 - Temporarily removed size estimates for audiences with multi PII

Investigating ad transparency mechanisms in social media

[SEE SLIDES OF OANA GOGA]