



# Privacy in Targeted advertising and Facebook ad targeting

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# Cambridge Analytica scandal

- A lot of user's data collected
- Political ads that target users



- Reactions
  - How did they collect all that data?
  - Why collect this data? What did it allow them to do?

# Why collect this data? What did it allow them to do?

"Cambridge Analytica generally utilizes **custom audiences**, some of which were created from contact lists and other identifiers... and in some instances, refined those audiences with **additional targeting attributes**."

- Facebook (in response to U.S. Senate questions)

How many of you understand what this means?

## Targeted advertising


• Users who see ad called the *audience* 

How can advertiser select their audience?


Ad on a broadcast medium (TV)

Ad targeting search keywords


Ad targeting *user attributes* 



#### Ads on Facebook




# Anyone can be an advertiser in just a few clicks!



#### Targeting method 1: Attributes

- Advertiser can include/exclude attributes to create audience
- Attributes attached to users based on
  - Facebook activity
  - Third-party Web browsing
  - "Partner" companies
- >1,200 well-defined attributes
- >250,000 free-form attributes




## How can advertisers target users?


Traditional targeted advertising: boolean formula

Audience = married + new mover + lives in Grenoble

# Many attributes available for targeting



#### Attributes can be invasive



Slide of Oana Goga

#### Data on everyone

- Out of 230M users (US):
  - Politics (US): 179M
  - Financial/Net worth/Liquid Assets: 74M
  - Family & Relationships: 138M

Slide of Oana Goga

#### Where these attributes come from?

Collected all targeting attributes form 8 countries

Country	Facebook	Acxiom	Epsilon	Experia		Data broke unspecifie	
US	614	128	14	5	350	10	1121
UK	614	103	0	17	19	0	753
France	614	21	0	0	0	0	635
Germany	614	60	0	0	0	0	674
Australia	614	24	0	34	0	0	672
Brazil	614	0	0	20	0	0	634
Japan	614	17	0	0	0	0	631
India	614	0	0	0	0	0	614

Slide of Oana Goga

#### **PII-based targeting**

## Targeted advertising


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
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
Ad targeting search keywords

Ad targeting *user attributes* 

Ad targeting identified users




#### Targeting method 2: PII




#### Advantages for advertiser:

- 1. Pay only for users you want to reach
- 2. Exploit different external data sources

#### PII-based targeting is common



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


This is a query to the user database!

Could these statistics **intentionally** leak user information?

**Anybody** can be an advertiser...

#### Features of Facebook's size estimates




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
Goal: given victim's email address, find if victim is in a given list of phone numbers



Size estimate

#### **Exploiting these features**

Goal: given victim's email address, find if victim is in a given list of phone numbers



Size estimate

Victim in the list of phone numbers?

#### Attack: Infering user's phone numbers

Can ask: Is Victim in

Target list

Is **victim** in

100-000-0000 100-000-0001 100-000-0002 ... 199-999-9999

Is **victim** in

200-000-0000 200-000-0001 200-000-0002 ... 299-999-9999

Is **victim** in

010-000-0000 010-000-0001 010-000-0002 ... 919-999-9999

If **No**: First digit is not 1

If Yes: First digit is 1

If **No**: First digit is not 2

If **Yes**: First digit is 2

If **No**: Second digit is not 1

If **Yes**: Second digit is 1

#### Attacks discovered

- Other attacks:
  - De-anonymise individual visitors to attacker's website
  - Infer PII for visitors to attacker's website in masse
- All attacks are easy to launch and have a large-scale impact:
  - Anyone can conduct an attack
  - Any Facebook user can be a potential victim
  - No interaction with the victim.
- Responsibly disclosed with Facebook:
  - Temporarily removed size estimates for audiences with multi PII