



# Privacy in Targeted advertising and Facebook ads explanations

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
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


# Today's class

- Targeted advertising
- Real-Time Bidding protocol (RTB)
- Cookie synching
- Attribute and PII-based targeting on Facebook









#### 2010

#### **Display Advertising Technology Landscape**



#### 2017

### **VIDEO LUMA**scape











# Targeted Advertisement and Real-Time Bidding

COLLABORATION BETWEEN PUBLISHERS, AD EXCHANGES AND ADVERTISERS

# **Targeted advertisement**

 Targeted advertisement allows to assign a concrete ad to an interested user

 Real-Time Bidding (RTB) is a protocol for transacting digital display ads in real time




### Real-Time Bidding (RTB) AccuWeather **Advertisers** Ad Exchange doubleclick.com Newchic Newchic Newchic **AccuWeather** WINNER!!! Real-time-bidding (RTB)

# Why would advertiser bid on a user?








# **Cookie synchronization**

# What is a Cookie synchronization?


 the process by which two different trackers link the IDs they've given to the same user

# **Cookie synchronization**



# **Cookie Syncing**

• s.com matches their cookie with d.com using an HTTP redirect



# What if I delete all my cookies?


### Important detail:

If at least one tracker respawns one cookie, he passes it to other trackers

### Privacy problem:

■ Thus, even trackers that don't employ respawning gain the ability to continually track users who clear cookies!

# **Cookie syncing graphically**



# Large-scale study of cookie synching


- 100,000 domains
- doubleclick.net is synching the most:
  - 108 cookies to 118 partners
- The vast majority of top third parties sync cookies with at least one other party:
  - 45 out of top 50
  - 85 out of top 100
  - 157 out of top 200
  - 460 out of top 1,000

# Limitations on detection of synched IDs

- Only detect matched user IDs in clear not detected if IDs are obfuscated
- Two studied examined the behavior of DoubleClick only.
- Imprecise detection of information flows between companies because they rely on HTTP headers
  - Inclusion of dynamic content is not linked to the party that created it

# Real-Time Bidding (RTB)





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# Who is Cookie Matching?

Participant 1		Participant 2	Chains	Ads	Heuristics	
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	googlesyndication	9090	1887	$\leftarrow \rightarrow P$	
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	doubleclick	3610	1144	$\rightarrow$ E, P $\leftarrow$ DC, P	
criteo	$\leftrightarrow$	adnxs	3263	1066	<b>←→</b> E, P	
criteo	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$	rubiconproject	1586	749	<b>←→</b> E, P	
criteo	$\leftrightarrow$	servedbyopenx	707	460	<b>←→</b> P	
doubleclick	$\leftrightarrow$	steelhousemedia	362	27	$\rightarrow$ P $\leftarrow$ E, P	
mathtag	$\leftrightarrow$	mediaforge	360	124	<b>←→</b> E, P	
netmng	$\leftrightarrow$	scene7	267	119	→ E ←?	
googlesyndication	$\leftrightarrow$	adsrvr	107	29	$\leftarrow \rightarrow P$	
rubiconproject	$\leftrightarrow$	steelhousemedia	86	30	$\leftarrow \rightarrow$ E	
googlesyndication	$\leftrightarrow$	steelhousemedia	47	22	?	
adtechus	$\rightarrow$	adacado	36	18	?	
atwola	$\rightarrow$	adacado	32	6	?	

Heuristics Key (used by prior work)

**E** – share exact cookies

**P** – special URL parameters

**DC** – DoubleClick URL parameters

? – Unknown sharing method

# RTB and Tracking ecosystem

### Important detail:

 Targeted advertisement and RBT is based on personal data: cookies, browsing history, preferences...

### Transparency studies:

- Hard to analyse tracking and RTB together
- Only a part of the process is visible in the user's browser
- Hard to establish what data is collected by trackers

# Privacy Risks in Targeted Advertising

# **Cambridge Analytica scandal**

- A lot of user's data collected
- Political ads that target users



- Reactions
  - How did they collect all that data?
  - Why collect this data? What did it allow them to do?

# Why collect this data? What did it allow them to do?

"Cambridge Analytica generally utilizes **custom audiences**, some of which were created from contact lists and other identifiers... and in some instances, refined those audiences with **additional targeting attributes**."

- Facebook (in response to U.S. Senate questions)

How many of you understand what this means?

# Targeted advertising


• Users who see ad called the *audience* 

How can advertiser select their audience?


Ad on a broadcast medium (TV)

Ad targeting search keywords


Ad targeting *user attributes* 



### Ads on Facebook




# Anyone can be an advertiser in just a few clicks!





### Targeting method 1: Attributes

- Advertiser can include/exclude attributes to create audience
- Attributes attached to users based on
  - Facebook activity
  - Third-party Web browsing
  - "Partner" companies
- >1,200 well-defined attributes
- >250,000 free-form attributes




# How can advertisers target users?


Traditional targeted advertising: boolean formula

Audience = married + new mover + lives in Grenoble

# Many attributes available for targeting



### Attributes can be invasive



Slide of Oana Goga

### Data on everyone

- Out of 230M users (US):
  - Politics (US): 179M
  - Financial/Net worth/Liquid Assets: 74M
  - Family & Relationships: 138M

Slide of Oana Goga

### Where these attributes come from?

Collected all targeting attributes form 8 countries

Country	Facebook	Acxiom	Epsilon	Experia	n DLX I	Oata brok	er Total
					(ι	ınspecifie	(d)
US	614	128	14	5	350	10	1121
UK	614	103	0	17	19	0	753
France	614	21	0	0	0	0	635
Germany	614	60	0	0	0	0	674
Australia	614	24	0	34	0	0	672
Brazil	614	0	0	20	0	0	634
Japan	614	17	0	0	0	0	631
India	614	0	0	0	0	0	614

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# **PII-based targeting**

# Targeted advertising


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Ad targeting search keywords

Ad targeting *user attributes* 



# Targeted advertising

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
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Ad on a broadcast medium (TV)


Ad targeting search keywords

Ad targeting *user attributes* 

Ad targeting *identified users* 




# Targeting method 2: PII




#### Advantages for advertiser:

- 1. Pay only for users you want to reach
- 2. Exploit different **external data** sources

# PII-based targeting is common



# PII-based targeting is common




This is a query to the user database!

Could these statistics **intentionally** leak user information?

Anybody can be an advertiser...

### Features of Facebook's size estimates




# **Exploiting these features**



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
Goal: given victim's email address, find if victim is in a given list of phone numbers



Size estimate

# **Exploiting these features**

Goal: given victim's email address, find if victim is in a given list of phone numbers



Size estimate

Victim in the list of phone numbers?

### Attack: Infering user's phone numbers

Can ask: Is Victim in

Target list

100-000-0000 100-000-0001 100-000-0002 ... 199-999-9999

Is **victim** in

200-000-0000 200-000-0001 200-000-0002 ... 299-999-9999

Is **victim** in

010-000-0000 010-000-0001 010-000-0002 ... 919-999-9999

If **No**: First digit is not 1

If Yes: First digit is 1

If No: First digit is not 2

If **Yes**: First digit is 2

If **No**: Second digit is not 1

If **Yes**: Second digit is 1

### **Attacks discovered**

- Other attacks:
  - De-anonymise individual visitors to attacker's website
  - Infer PII for visitors to attacker's website in masse
- All attacks are easy to launch and have a large-scale impact:
  - Anyone can conduct an attack
  - Any Facebook user can be a potential victim
  - No interaction with the victim
- Responsibly disclosed with Facebook:
  - Temporarily removed size estimates for audiences with multi PII